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BAZE V. REES: LETHAL INJECTION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
METHOD OF EXECUTION
INTRODUCTION
In the realm of capital punishment, method-of-execution challenges
have become more common.' In Baze v. Rees,2 the United States Su-
preme Court considered whether Kentucky's lethal injection protocol
satisfied the Eighth Amendment.3 The Court held that the risk of pain
from potential maladministration of such a humane method of execution,
and Kentucky's refusal to adopt untested alternative methods, did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.4 The plurality developed a
three-step process for determining when a method of execution violates
the Eighth Amendment.5 When there is a "substantial risk of serious
harm" and "feasible, readily implemented" alternatives exist, a state vi-
olates the Eighth Amendment if it fails to adopt such alternatives, unless
it has a "legitimate penological justification" for such failure.6
As this Comment presents, the plurality's approach solved some
problems associated with method-of-execution challenges, but other
troubles remain. By implementing a purposive test in the creation of its
"substantial risk" standard, the Court eliminated some of the subjective
problems associated with the "evolving standards of decency" test.7
However, the Court did not perform a proper pain analysis, practically
ignoring scientific testing and medical evidence surrounding lethal injec-
tion.8 Without such an inquiry, there is no guarantee that the use of le-
thal injection will comport with the Eighth Amendment.9
Part I of this Comment reviews the history of methods of execution
and the creation of lethal injection. Part II provides an overview of the
plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part I analyzes lethal
injection in light of the plurality opinion. Part III suggests that the plu-
rality integrated a purposive test for constitutionality into the objective
"evolving standards of decency" test, thus comporting with the penologi-
cal goals of society and creating stronger precedent. Part III also argues,
1. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dis-
mantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 107 (2007).
2. 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
3. Id. at 1529.
4. Id. at 1526.
5. Id. at 1532.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1531; see William W. Berry I1, Following the Yellow Brick Road of Evolving
Standards of Decency: The Ironic Consequences of "Death-is-Different" Jurisprudence, 28 PACE
L. REV. 15, 17-25 (2007).
8. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1533.
9. See Denno, supra note 1, at 121.
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however, that the Court should perform an extensive pain analysis, in-
cluding both scientific testing and medical opinion evidence, in order to
ensure that lethal injection complies with the Eighth Amendment. Final-
ly, Part Il concludes by proposing methods by which society can assure
the constitutionality of lethal injection as the least severe method of ex-
ecution.
I. BACKGROUND
A. A History of Methods of Execution and Oklahoma's Creation of Le-
thal Injection
The Eighth Amendment provides that "cruel and unusual punish-
ments [shall not be] inflicted."' 10 Capital punishment has not traditionally
been considered cruel and unusual, provided that the methods of execu-
tion are not excessive and comport with "evolving standards of decen-
cy.
' 11
As society's view of humane punishment has changed, so have its
methods of execution. 12 Hanging was the principal form of punishment
both before and after the enactment of the Eighth Amendment. 3 Occa-
sionally, death sentences were intensified through the use of "superad-
ded" punishments, but by the late eighteenth century such violent modes
of execution were considered both cruel and unusual.14 In 1888, New
York became the first state to consider electrocution as a more humane
form of punishment. 1' While some states used the firing squad and lethal
gas as their methods of execution at one time, electrocution remained the
predominant method for nearly a century.' 6 Eventually, botched electro-
cutions gave rise to intense scrutiny of the execution method, and the
public began to view lethal injection as a safer, more humane alterna-
tive. 17
In 1977, Oklahoma became the first state to implement lethal injec-
tion.' 8 Chief medical examiner A. Jay Chapman, while clear about his
lack of expertise, nonetheless agreed to develop a lethal injection formu-
la. 19 Chapman created a vague standard that originally provided for the
injection of two drugs, sodium thiopental (still used in modern lethal
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
11. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958)).
12. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1538.
13. Id. at 1556.
14. Id. at 1557-58.
15. Id. at 1526.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Denno, supra note 1, at 62-64.
18. Id. at 65 ("At each step in the political process, concerns about cost, speed, aesthetics, and





injections) and chloral hydrate. 20 However, Chapman later modified the
protocol to include a third drug, potassium chloride. a Concern about a
lack of testing stalled the lethal injection bill during the legislative de-
bate. 2 However, on March 2, 1977, Oklahoma voted to adopt lethal
injection as the state's execution method.23 In doing so, Oklahoma
created a lethal injection template, which other states quickly imple-
mented, usually without further analysis. 24
B. United States Supreme Court Precedents Regarding Methods of
Execution
The United States Supreme Court has issued three key opinions re-
garding methods of execution. In Wilkerson v. Utah,25 the Court upheld
the constitutionality of firing squads.26 In Wilkerson, the Court held that
only punishments involving "unnecessary cruelty" violated the Eighth
Amendment. 27 These unnecessarily cruel punishments included exotic
tortures such as emboweling alive or beheading. 28 The Court took a his-
torical approach in its analysis, citing cases from England in which pain
or terror were "superadded" to the punishment of death. 29 The Court
stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments involving tor-
ture and any other unnecessarily cruel punishments.30  However, the
Court pointed out that this category did not include the firing squad as a
method of execution.3
In In re Kemmler,32 the Court carried the method of execution anal-
ysis further. Although the Court actually decided the case on a "question
of jurisdiction," Kemmler allowed electrocution as a more humane me-
33thod of execution. In dicta, the Court stated that "punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment
of death is not cruel .... [A cruel punishment] implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment
20. Id. at 67.
21. Id. at 74.
22. Id. at 70.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 78-79.
25. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
26. Julian Davis Mortenson, Earning the Right to be Retributive: Execution Methods, Culpa-
bility Theory, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 88 IOWA L. REv. 1099, 1108 (2003).
27. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136.
28. Id. at 135.
29. Id. (stating that superadded punishments included public dissection, burning or embowe-
ling alive, beheading, and quartering).
30. Id. at 136.
31. Id. at 134-135.
32. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
33. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1108.
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of life. 3 4 The Supreme Court routinely cites this "negligible pain" stan-
dard in its application of the Eighth Amendment.35
In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,36 a plurality of the Court
upheld a second attempt to execute a prisoner after the first attempted
electrocution failed due to a mechanical malfunction.37 The Court con-
cluded that a mere accident did not violate the Eighth Amendment be-
cause there was no "purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unneces-
sary pain involved. 38 The Constitution only protected an inmate from
cruelty inherent in the method of execution, not any suffering involved in
death.39
In sum, method of execution challenges began with Wilkerson, in
which the Court determined that "unnecessarily cruel" punishments vi-
olated the Eighth Amendment. 40 In Kemmler, the Court carried the anal-
ysis further. It developed the "negligible pain standard," determining
that the punishment of death itself was not cruel, but that a method of
execution cannot inflict unnecessary or wanton pain.4' Finally, in Res-
weber, the Court decided that where there was no purpose to inflict pain,
there was no Eighth Amendment violation; thus, a mere accident would
comport with the Eighth Amendment. 42 Current Supreme Court method-
of-execution jurisprudence uses these famous cases as its basis.43
II. BAZE V. REES4
A. Facts
Petitioners Ralph Baze and Thomas C. Bowling were each con-
victed of double homicide and sentenced to death in Kentucky. 5 Baze
and Bowling sued, seeking to have Kentucky's lethal injection protocol
declared unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.4 6 While peti-
tioners conceded that lethal injection, if applied as intended, would result
in a humane death, they contended that Kentucky's lethal injection pro-
34. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
35. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1108 (noting that the Supreme Court regularly looks to
Kemmler for the proposition that capital punishment cannot "involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain").
36. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
37. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008).
38. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.
39. Id.
40. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).
41. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,447 (1890).
42. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.
43. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1530-31 (2008).
44. 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
45. Id. at 1528-29.
46. Id. at 1529.
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tocol was unconstitutional because of a risk of severe pain if the protocol
was not properly followed.47
1. Objective Review of Kentucky's Lethal Injection Protocol
Kentucky's protocol consists of the injection of three drugs. 48 The
first is sodium thiopental, a barbiturate anesthetic that induces uncons-
ciousness, thus preventing the prisoner from feeling any pain.49 The
second drug is pancuronium bromide, which causes paralysis and stops
respiration.50  Kentucky specifies potassium chloride as the third and
final drug.51 Potassium chloride induces cardiac arrest, ultimately caus-
ing the prisoner's death.
2
In addition to identifying the three drugs to be used in the execution,
the Kentucky protocol also specifies the procedures to be followed.5 3 It
requires qualified personnel with at least one year of professional expe-
rience to insert the IV catheters, but only the warden and deputy warden
remain in the execution chamber. 54 The execution team administers the
drugs from the control room through five feet of IV tubing.55 If visual
inspection by the warden demonstrates that the prisoner is still conscious
within sixty seconds of delivery of the sodium thiopental, another dose of
the drug is administered.56 A physician is present to attempt to revive the
prisoner in the event of a stay of execution at the last minute.5 7 An elec-
trocardiogram verifies death.58
2. Challenges to Kentucky's Protocol
Petitioners raised several challenges to Kentucky's lethal injection
protocol. First, petitioners alleged that there was a danger of unneces-
sary pain if the executioners used an inadequate dosage of sodium thi-
opental, the first drug.59 If the execution team administered the sodium
thiopental properly, the condemned prisoner would feel no pain when the
pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride were added. 60 However, if
the dosage of sodium thiopental was inadequate, the administration of
the second and third drugs would cause the prisoner to slowly suffocate
47. Id. at 1526.
48. Id. at 1528.










59. Id. at 1533.
60. See id. at 1536.
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to death, thus experiencing excruciating pain.6' Petitioners claimed that
there was a risk of an improper dosage because Kentucky employed un-
trained executioners and because of potential problems with Kentucky's
injection practices.62
Next, petitioners challenged the use of pancuronium bromide.6 3 As
a paralyzing agent, pancuronium bromide could prevent any indication
that the prisoner was experiencing a painful death because he or she
would be unable to move or cry out.64 The drug would also mask any
other visible signs of pain.65 Petitioners argued that, in light of these
dangers, the use of pancuronium bromide was unnecessary, because it
served no therapeutic purpose while masking signs of possible distress.
66
Potential problems also exist with the use of potassium chloride.
67
If administered to a conscious person, potassium chloride could cause an
excruciating, burning pain.68 Thus, if the execution team did not admi-
nister a proper dosage of sodium thiopental, the first drug, the inmate
would die an extremely painful death.69 However, petitioners' argument
focused on the dangers associated with sodium thiopental and pancuro-
nium bromide, ignoring the dangers of potassium chloride.7 °
Because of the potential problems associated with Kentucky's
three-drug protocol, petitioners proposed a new one-drug protocol, which
has never been tried or adopted by any state.71 Petitioners' one-drug
protocol consisted only of the injection of a barbiturate such as sodium
thiopental. 72 They argued that such a protocol is regularly used by vete-
rinarians during animal euthanasia, and that many states actually forbid
veterinarians to use paralytic agents such as pancuronium bromide.73
61. Teresa A. Zimmers & Leonidas G. Koniaris, Peer-Reviewed Studies Identifying Problems
in the Design and Implementation of Lethal Injection for Execution, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 919,
921 (2008).
62. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1533 (noting that these problems included possible difficulties with the
IV lines, inadequate facilities and training, and the fact that Kentucky had no reliable way to monitor
a prisoner's "anesthetic depth").
63. Id. at 1535.
64. Deborah W. Denno, Introduction, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 701, 702 (2008). "Even a slight
error in dosage or administration can leave a prisoner conscious but paralyzed while dying, a sentient
witness of his or her own slow, lingering asphyxiation." Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1191
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
65. The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Challenges Facing Society in the Implementation
of the Death Penalty, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 763, 774 (2008).
66. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1535.
67. See Gaitan, supra note 65, at 774.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1533-35.
71. Id. at 1526.
72. Id. at 1534.
73. Id. at 1535.
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Finally, petitioners alleged that Kentucky's protocol lacked a me-
thod to monitor the "anesthetic depth" of the inmate.74 They suggested
that Kentucky use a variety of measures to verify that the prisoner was
indeed unconscious before injecting the final two drugs.75
B. Procedural Posture
After extensive hearings, the Kentucky trial court recognized the
absence of satisfactory methods of execution for those who oppose the
death penalty but concluded nonetheless that Kentucky's protocol com-
plied with the Eighth Amendment.76 The Kentucky Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that a method of execution violates the Eighth Amend-
ment when it "creates a substantial risk of wanton and unnecessary in-
fliction of pain, torture, and lingering death. 77 Kentucky's protocol did
not violate this standard.78
C. Opinion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether Kentucky's lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth
Amendment.79 The plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts
and joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, affirmed the Kentucky Su-
preme Court's decision.80 The Court held that the risk of pain from the
three-drug protocol, and Kentucky's failure to adopt the untested one-
drug method, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.81
The plurality created a three-step test to determine whether a me-
thod of execution was cruel and unusual.82 First, the plurality rejected
both petitioners' "unnecessary risk" standard and the dissent's "untoward
risk" standard, adopting instead a "substantial risk of serious harm" stan-
dard and describing such a risk as an "objectively intolerable risk of
harm., 83 Under this standard, the mere possibility of pain would not
establish a risk of harm that would qualify as cruel and unusual under the
Eighth Amendment.84 Second, it was not enough that the condemned
prisoner suggested a slightly safer alternative. 85 Rather, any proffered
alternative would have to be "feasible, readily implemented, and in fact
74. Id. at 1536.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1526.
77. Id. at 1529.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1526.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1531-32.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1531.
85. Id.
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significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. 86 Third, the state
needed a legitimate penological justification for the refusal to adopt a
feasible alternative.87 If the state did not have a legitimate justification,
its refusal to alter its method of execution violated the Eighth Amend-
ment.
88
In applying its newly-described standard, the plurality opinion re-
jected petitioners' claims. 89 First, lethal injection could not be "objec-
tively intolerable" because a majority of the states and the federal gov-
ernment have adopted both the method of execution and the three-drug
combination.90 Second, petitioners did not show a substantial risk of an
inadequate dose of sodium thiopental being administered, especially in
light of the safeguards that Kentucky employed.91 Kentucky required
experience and training for the members of its execution team, mandated
the presence of the warden and deputy warden in the execution chamber
to monitor the inmate's consciousness, and established a backup line in
case the primary injection failed.92 Furthermore, as long as the team
followed the manufacturer's instructions regarding the handling of so-
dium thiopental, there was minimal risk of improper application, even if
a layperson injected the drug.93 Thus, while petitioners argued that an
improper dose of the drug would result in a substantial risk of suffocation
from the pancuronium bromide and pain from the potassium chloride,
they failed to show that the risk of an inadequate dose was substantial.94
Third, the plurality rejected the adoption of the untested one-drug
protocol.95 No other state has adopted such a method, and there was
nothing to indicate that it was an equally effective method of lethal injec-
tion.9 6 The plurality rejected petitioners' claims that pancuronium bro-
mide served no therapeutic purpose and suppressed movements that
might indicate consciousness.97 According to the plurality, pancuronium
bromide was necessary because it not only prevented involuntary spasms
during unconsciousness once the potassium chloride was injected, thus
ensuring that the procedure retained its dignity, but it also stopped respi-
ration.98 The Eighth Amendment, therefore, did not forbid Kentucky
86. Id. at 1532.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1537-38.
90. Id. at 1532 (indicating that thirty-six states and the federal government had adopted lethal
injection as their method of execution, while thirty states and the federal government employed the
three-drug protocol used in Kentucky).
91. Id. at 1533.
92. Id. at 1533-34.
93. Id. at 1533.
94. Id.






from using the drug in its execution procedure.99 Additionally, although
veterinary medicine guidelines prohibit veterinarians from using such a
paralytic agent during animal euthanasia, the plurality pointed to the fact
that the states have a legitimate interest in preserving the inmates' digni-
ty that is not present in animal euthanasia.' ° Moreover, the Netherlands
allows physician-assisted suicide, and that country recommends the use
of such a drug in order to prevent an undignified death. 101
Fourth, the Court rejected petitioners' argument that the Kentucky
protocol lacked a method to monitor the "anesthetic depth" of the in-
mate. 102 The Court stated that, because a proper dosage of sodium thi-
opental would result in a satisfactory anesthetic depth, the risks of con-
sciousness during the procedure were not substantial.10 3 Furthermore,
Kentucky implemented satisfactory safeguards in its protocol; conse-
quently, the addition of further steps would still not be sufficient to en-
tirely ensure a painless process.I°4
Finally, pointing to the fact that the three previous method-of-
execution challenges were also rejected in Wilkerson, Kemmler, and
Resweber, the plurality suggested that society has nonetheless moved
toward more humane methods of execution, currently settling on lethal
injection. 10 5 The plurality stated that its decision would not prevent the
legislatures from taking any steps they deem necessary to ensure humane
methods of execution, just as they had done in the past. 106
D. Concurring Opinions
Five concurring opinions indicated the wide range of views sur-
rounding method-of-execution challenges. 0 7 First, Justice Alito argued
that because ethical guidelines prohibit medical professionals from par-
ticipating in executions, requiring their participation in such a procedure
could not be a "feasible" alternative under the plurality's standard.
10 8
Justice Alito then argued that proof of a well-established scientific con-
sensus should accompany any method-of-execution challenge, 1°9 and he
concluded by reminding the Court that the issue in this case was the con-




102. Id. at 1536.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1538.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1538, 1542, 1552, 1556, 1563.
108. Id. at 1540 (Alito, J., concurring).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1542.
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Justice Stevens lamented that the plurality's decision left open ques-
tions surrounding the constitutionality of the three-drug protocol and the
justification for the death penalty itself."' First, Justice Stevens ques-
tioned each of the three rationales commonly cited in support of the
death penalty." 2 Quickly rejecting both incapacitation and deterrence as
justifications, Justice Stevens focused on the retributive rationale, ar-
guing that this rationale is undermined by society's insistence on more
humane forms of punishment that protect an inmate from suffering pain
comparable to that which he inflicted on his victim." 3 Second, Justice
Stevens relied on his own subjective experience to conclude that the im-
position of the death penalty is excessive and thus violates the Eighth
Amendment.114 However, because stare decisis required him to adhere to
precedent, Justice Stevens concurred in the plurality's judgment.15
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, responded to Justice Ste-
vens, basing his argument in favor of the death penalty on the text of the
Presentment and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment."' Jus-
tice Scalia's strongest attack against Justice Stevens rested on the retribu-
tive rationale of the death penalty." 17 Justice Scalia pointed out the major
flaw in Justice Stevens's reasoning: Justice Stevens proposed that any
punishment that inflicts pain violates the Eighth Amendment, but pu-
nishment must inflict pain proportionate to that of the offender's crime in
order to be properly retributive."18 Justice Scalia concluded by accusing
Justice Stevens of ruling by judicial fiat in taking his experience into
account over, and indeed at the expense of, the experience of all oth-
ers.
1 19
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, looked to history and Su-
preme Court precedent to suggest that a method of execution violates the
Eighth Amendment only if it is "deliberately designed to inflict pain."' 2°
Justice Thomas argued that Kentucky did not intend to inflict pain but
instead adopted its protocol in an effort to make its executions more hu-
mane. 12 Justice Thomas also disagreed with the plurality's formulation
of the governing standard, worrying that the plurality's decision would
require the Court to resolve controversies beyond its expertise.1 22
111. Id. at 1542-43 (Stevens, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 1547.
113. Id. at 1547-48.
114. Id. at 1551.
115. Id. at 1552.
116. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 1554.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1555.
120. Id. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 1563.
122. Id. at 1562.
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Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Ginsburg's dissent regarding the
proper standard. 23 However, after a review of the related literature, Jus-
tice Breyer concluded that the adoption of more thorough measures of
consciousness would not make a noteworthy difference in the safety of
lethal injection.124 Thus, Justice Breyer concluded that Kentucky's pro-
tocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment because it did not create "a
significant risk of unnecessary suffering."'
' 25
E. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, proposed "untoward,
readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain" as the
appropriate pain standard. 126 Justice Ginsburg would have inquired into
whether Kentucky's omission of basic safeguards regarding uncons-
ciousness violated this standard. 127 Citing a string of practices in other
states, Justice Ginsburg proposed a variety of safeguards beyond mere
visual inspection to ensure unconsciousness after the injection of the first
drug. 128 These measures included calling the inmate's name, shaking
him, brushing his eyelashes, or presenting him with a noxious stimu-
lus. 12 9 Justice Ginsburg argued that the degree of risk, magnitude of
pain, and availability of alternatives are interrelated factors, and a strong
showing of one reduces the significance of the others. 30 Justice Gins-
burg proposed that a state fails to adhere to "contemporary standards of
decency" if it does not employ "readily available" method-of-execution
alternatives that will decrease the potential for pain.13' Finally, Justice
Ginsburg would require Kentucky to conduct scientific studies and con-
sult with medical professionals regarding lethal injection instead of
merely falling "in line" behind Oklahoma.
32
I1. ANALYSIS
In Baze v. Rees, the Court attempted to redefine the test of constitu-
tionality surrounding methods of execution. While it succeeded to some
degree by integrating a purposive test into the objective aspects of the
"evolving standards of decency" test, its analysis did not go far enough.
Extensive scrutiny of the potential for pain caused by botched lethal in-
jections, including an evaluation of scientific tests and medical opinion
evidence, would more fully guarantee compliance with the Eighth
123. Id. at 1563 (Breyer, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 1566.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1569-71 (including Oklahoma, Florida, California, Alabama, and Indiana).
129. Id. at 1569.
130. Id. at 1568.
131. Id. at 1569.
132. Id.
2009]
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Amendment. 133 Furthermore, while beyond the scope of Baze, the use of
a national litigation strategy accompanied by a constitutional tort and
more transparent lethal injection protocols would help to ensure the con-
stitutionality of lethal injection.
A. Integration of a Purposive Test with the "Evolving Standards of
Decency" Test
Courts use the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine to deter-
mine whether a punishment is "excessive.' 35 Originally, any death pe-
nalty practice needed to comport with "evolving standards of decency" in
order to comply with the Eighth Amendment. 36 However, the subjective
aspect of the "evolving standards of decency" test presents several prob-
lems.137 In an attempt to solve these problems, the Court in Baze inte-
grated a "purposive" test into the "evolving standards of decency" analy-
sis. 138 By focusing on the state's penological purpose, the purposive test
corrects many of the problems associated with the subjective aspects of
the "evolving standards of decency" test. M
1. The "Evolving Standards of Decency" Test
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment includes the right to be free from excessive sanctions. 40 It thus
incorporates the concept of proportionality, requiring that the degree of
punishment for the offense fit the seriousness of the crime. 141 Consider-
ing that the death penalty is irreversible and extremely severe, the pro-
portionality analysis has particular importance in death penalty cases.
14 2
In order to determine whether a punishment is disproportional and there-
fore excessive, the Court looks to currently prevailing societal norms and
values rather than the standards in place when the Eighth Amendment
was adopted. 43 Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment "draw[s] its mean-
ing from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.144
In evaluating the Eighth Amendment in light of society's "evolving
standards of decency," the Court looks to objective factors whenever
133. See Denno, supra note 1, at 121.
134. See Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1162-63; see also Dwight Aarons, The Abolitionist's
Dilemma: Establishing the Standards for the Evolving Standards of Decency, 6 PIERCE L. REv. 441,
466-67 (2008); Gaitan, supra note 65, at 784.
135. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-312 (2002).
136. Aarons, supra note 134, at 444.
137. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 7, at 22-24.
138. See id. at 19.
139. See id. at 31.
140. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
141. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
142. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
143. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008).
144. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
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possible. 45 Originally, courts used six objective factors to determine the
contemporary values indicative of "evolving standards of decency."
146
The most significant of these factors are: 1) statutes enacted by the na-
tion's legislatures and 2) jury verdicts. These two factors are immensely
important because they reflect public opinion on contemporary norms
and values.147  Courts will rarely have a better sense of the Nation's
views on a particular topic than the members of the legislature, elected
by the American people, or the members of a jury, comprised of the
American people.
148
In Baze, the plurality implemented this objective "evolving stan-
dards of decency" test by looking to four of the six objective factors.
49
The Court began its analysis with a review of the history of methods of
execution. 50 It determined that because society has steadily moved to-
ward more humane execution methods, ultimately settling on lethal in-
jection, lethal injection must be consistent with society's standards of
decency. 151 Next, the Court studied judicial precedent, concluding that
the Court has never invalidated a chosen method of execution when chal-
lenges have arisen. 152 Third, the Court looked to the practice of state
legislatures and the federal government to determine whether lethal in-
jection was "objectively intolerable."' 53 In light of the number of states
using the three-drug combination in their protocols, and considering that
no state had implemented a one-drug protocol, the Court determined that
Kentucky's lethal injection protocol did not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment. 154 Finally, the Court looked to international practices in order to
rebut the claim that the states should implement a one-drug protocol.
55
The Court indicated that the Netherlands, a country that allows physi-
cian-assisted suicide, uses a muscle relaxant in addition to sodium thi-
opental in order to prevent an undignified and painful death. 56 Thus, in
its analysis, the Baze Court implemented four of the six "evolving stan-
145. See Berry, supra note 7, at 21-22 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312).
146. Aarons, supra note 134, at 445 (stating that the objective factors were: (1) history; (2)
judicial precedent; (3) statutes; (4) jury verdicts; (5) penological goals; and (6) international and
comparative law).
147. Id.
148. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 323 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
149. See infra notes 150-56.
150. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1526-27 (2008).
151. Id. at 1538. "[fIn moving to lethal injection, the states were motivated by a desire to find
a more humane alternative to then-existing methods." Id. at 1527 n 1.
152. Id. at 1530 (analyzing Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) and In re Kemmler, 136
U.S. 436 (1890)).
153. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532.
154. Id. "Of these 36 states [using lethal injection as their primary means of execution], at
least 30 (including Kentucky) use the same combination of three drugs in their lethal injection proto-
cols." Id. at 1527.
155. Id. at 1535.
156. Id.
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dards of decency" factors to determine that Kentucky's lethal injection
protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
157
2. The Subjective Element of "Evolving Standards of Decency"
and Its Problems
While the objective factors are still important in the "evolving stan-
dards of decency" inquiry, recent Supreme Court decisions add a subjec-
tive element to that test.158 Consequently, objective evidence is no long-
er entirely determinative of whether a death penalty practice is "exces-
sive.''159 Instead, courts are now required to balance objective evidence
of contemporary values with their own judgment in deciding whether the
Eighth Amendment has been violated. 16°
The incorporation of subjective factors into the "evolving standards
of decency" analysis is potentially problematic.' 61  A court's use of its
own subjective judgment in making Eighth Amendment decisions gives
it the opportunity to override the views of the American people and their
elected legislators regarding contemporary norms and values. 62 Eighth
Amendment challenges are thus decided by the "feelings and intuition"
of the justices rather than by the people themselves.' 63  This poses a
problem because the Eighth Amendment reflects society's "evolving
standards of decency"; in order to determine those standards, the court
must look to the legislatures, elected by the people, and to juries, repre-
sentatives of the people, rather than prescribe the standards itself.164 As
Justice Scalia emphasized in his Baze concurrence, the subjective "evolv-
ing standards of decency" test opens the door to "rule by judicial fiat,"
' 165
creating a situation in which precedent might easily be overturned and in
which the "evolving standards of decency" determination is no longer a
reflection of the contemporary values of the American people. 
66
157. See supra notes 150-56.
158. Aarons, supra note 134, at 448; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312
("[Iln the end [the Justices'] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptabili-
ty of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." (quoting Coker v. Georgia., 433 U.S. 584,
597 (1977))). Atkins looked to only three of the six objective factors in its decision, while Roper
used only four.
159. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
160. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 605 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
161. Berry, supra note 7, at 24 (stating that the use of subjective factors "creates the perception
that the Court's interpretation of the objective standards is merely a pretext for the expression of
their subjective views.").
162. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
163. Id. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Roper, 543 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("By what conceivable warrant can nine
lawyers presume to be the authoritative conscience of the Nation?").
165. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1555 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
166. See Aarons, supra note 134, at 452; see also Berry, supra note 7, at 28 ("[l]f the Court's
imposition of restrictions on the use of the death penalty is tied to ... the subjective views of its
members, then its decisions are merely written in pencil, waiting to be rewritten."); Gregg v. Geor-
gia., 428 U.S. 153, 175-76 (1976) ("In a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to
respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people." (quoting Furman v. Georgia.,
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3. To Correct These Problems with Subjectivity, Baze Adopts the
Purposive Test
167
A "purposive test of constitutionality" solves the problem presented
by the subjective factors in the "evolving standards of decency" test. 168
Under the purposive test, as developed by William W. Berry III,69 if a
court finds a method of execution to be both "degrading in its severity"
(cruel) and "wantonly imposed" (unusual), the burden will switch to the
states to show that the same penological goal could not be achieved by a
less severe punishment.170 Originally, only methods of punishment simi-
lar to torture were considered "degrading in severity" and thus cruel.'
17
However, the Court later expanded the phrase to prohibit any type of
degradation, potentially even the "the cruelty of pain."'' 72 The Court in-
terpreted the prohibition against "unusual" punishments to mean one of
two things. 173 It can refer to either a method of punishment that is rare,
or a method of punishment that is "arbitrary and discriminatory" ("wan-
tonly imposed"). 74 If the method of punishment is found to be both "de-
grading in its severity" and "wantonly imposed," the state has the burden
of justifying the imposition and severity of the chosen method of execu-
tion.175 If the state cannot justify the method it selected, it must imple-
ment a less severe method of execution in order to comply with the
Eighth Amendment.
176
Accordingly, the purposive test looks at the purpose of the state's
method of execution.177 The test focuses on the "potential abuse of state
power" by assessing the state's intention in implementing its chosen ex-
ecution method. 78 The test evaluates a method of execution by asking
whether the state's purpose is to inflict pain as punishment, or whether
the purpose is to inflict the least amount of pain necessary to execute.
179
408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (internal marks omitted))); Roper, 543 U.S. at
616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Juries 'maintain a link between contemporary community values and
the penal system' that this Court cannot claim for itself." (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181)).
167. See Berry, supra note 7, at 17-18.
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 18-19.
171. Id. at 18; see also Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penal-
ty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1785 (1970).
172. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910); see also Berry, supra note 7, at 18;
Goldberg, supra note 171, at 1786.
173. Berry, supra note 7, at 19.
174. Id.; see also Goldberg, supra note 171, at 1790-91.
175. Goldberg, supra note 171, at 1784, 1794.
176. Id. at 1794.
177. See Jeffrey Waincymer, Commentary: Reformulated Gasoline Under Reformulated WTO
Dispute Settlement Procedures: Pulling Pandora Out of a Chapeau?, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 141,
172 (1996) ("To speak of 'means' can be linguistically suggestive of a purposive test.").
178. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Circling Around the Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach but
not a Robust Right, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 19(2006),
www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol I05/griffin.pdf.
179. See generally Berry, supra note 7; see also Griffin, supra note 178. The purposive test is
used in a wide variety of contexts (see Christian M. De Vos, Mind the Gap: Purpose, Pain, and the
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The purposive test seeks to protect "the dignity of man," a concept inhe-
rent in the Eighth Amendment, by forbidding excessive punishment. 180
Although originally proposed in the context of the death penalty itself,18'
the test can also be applied to methods of execution. It is a systematic
approach to analyzing whether a method of punishment is cruel and un-
usual. 
82
a. The Purpose of Lethal Injection is to Inflict the Least
Amount of Pain Necessary to Execute
The issue of whether a state's purpose should be to inflict pain as
punishment or to inflict the least amount of pain necessary to execute is
highly contentious.1 83 It is clear that the Constitution "does not require a
pain free death, nor should it.'' 84  However, it is also clear that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the implementation of the "unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain. 1 85 Arguments are heated as to where the
purpose of lethal injection fits between these two boundaries.
1 86
Retributivists argue that a punishment involving too little pain un-
dermines the retributive function of the death penalty.187 They suggest
that the most atrocious killers deserve to die an extremely painful
death.1 88  Supporters of this view claim that the ideas of "punishment"
and "pain" cannot be separated, because in order for punishment to be
punishment, it must be painful. 89 However, even extreme retributivists
admit that while society inflicts pain on criminals because they deserve
it, such pain may only be inflicted to an extent that is proportional to the
crimes committed.' 90 The problem with lethal injection under the retri-
butivist view is that, by not distinguishing between the very violent and
Difference Between Torture and Inhuman Treatment, 14 No. 2 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 4 (2007) (human
rights); Eloise Scotford, Trash or Treasure: Policy Tensions in EC Waste Regulation, 19 J. ENVTL.
L. 367 (2007) (environmental law); Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19 (2000) (employment law)), but at the time of
publication there were no cases directly on point regarding use of the purposive test in this context.
180. Berry, supra note 7, at 17.
181. ld. at 18.
182. Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 171, at 1784.
183. See Robert Blecker, Killing Them Softly: Meditations on a Painful Punishment of Death,
35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 980-81 (2008) (indicating that, during oral argument in Baze, counsel
for the condemned and Justice Scalia found common ground only in the idea that the "Constitution
permitted a risk-free punishment of painless death, while it forbade the intentional infliction of
painful death.").
184. Gaitan, supra note 65, at 787.
185. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
186. See Blecker, supra note 183, at 970-74 (revealing the two extremes of the debate by
discussing retributivist and utilitarian views); see also Gaitan, supra note 65, at 764 (adopting a
utilitarian view and focusing not on the condemned's crimes but on whether the sentence will com-
port with the Eighth Amendment).
187. See Denno, supra note 64, at 731.
188. Blecker, supra note 183, at 970.
189. Id. at 971-72.
190. Id. at 973 ("The Biblical 'eye for an eye,' originally understood as no more than an eye
for an eye, exemplifies retribution as a restriction on pain as much as justification of punishment.").
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barbarous murderers and those who inflicted relatively little pain on their
victims, the states seem willing to arbitrarily expose all murderers to the
excruciating pain inherent in a botched lethal injection.1 91 Therefore,
even retributivists occasionally condemn lethal injection, not because it
has the potential to cause pain, but because it arbitrarily breaks the con-
nection between crime and punishment that is necessary to avoid an
Eighth Amendment violation. 
192
In contrast, utilitarians believe that physical pain can never be used
as an "instrument of justice" if the punishment is to be humane, even if
some degree of pain may be inherent in the punishment. 193 Pain cannot
be inflicted for the "sake of the past"; rather, the purpose of punishment
is to deter others. 94 Consequently, punishments should offer the strong-
est impressions in the minds of witnesses while subjecting the criminal to
the least amount of pain possible.195 Supporters of the utilitarian view
argue that the mere act of killing inflicts enough pain on the condemned
to "balance the scales" of justice. 196 While utilitarians acknowledge the
potential for pain in any method of execution, they also urge that the
process be as painless as possible.
197
Supreme Court precedent developed in the direction of the utilita-
rian approach.198 In Kemmler, the Court stated that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."' 99 In
Resweber, the Court explained that the Constitution protects against pu-
nishments that are inherently cruel, not against any pain that may be in-
volved in a humane execution method. 200 The contention in many me-
thod-of-execution challenges is that the "evolving standards of decency"
test requires that executioners use a method of execution that brings "as
little physical pain as possible to the condemned., 20' In other words, an
execution should be so painless that the punishment is reduced to nothing
more than death itself.20 2 Similarly, Supreme Court precedent defines the
states' purpose in executions as inflicting the least amount of pain neces-
sary to execute rather than as inflicting pain as punishment in itself.
20 3
191. Id. at 997.
192. Id. at 998.
193. Id. at 993.
194. Id. at 972.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 970.
197. Id. Both retributivists and utilitarians agree, however, that "gratuitous pain and suffering"
is never allowed under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 974.
198. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); see also La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459,464 (1947).
199. Kemnzler, 136 U.S. at 447.
200. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.
201. Aarons, supra note 134, at 461.
202. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1137.
203. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 437; see also Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.
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To a certain degree, the Baze plurality followed precedent by im-
plementing this utilitarian approach. While the Court indicated that
some pain may be inherent in capital punishment, it also suggested that
the state's purpose should be to inflict only an amount of pain that would
not pose a "substantial risk" of harm.204 The Court never discussed
whether an appropriate punishment might actually require a painful
death.20 5 Instead, it focused on the fact that a method of execution could
inflict some pain, as long as it did not present an "objectively intolerable
risk of harm., 20 6 In fact, the Court offered the opportunity for a con-
demned inmate to show that an alternative method of execution existed
that "reduce[d] a substantial risk of severe pain., 20 7 It could hardly be
inferred that the Court would allow the state to purposely inflict pain;
otherwise, it would not have presented the opportunity to develop a pro-
cedure that reduces the risk of pain. Accordingly, the Baze plurality in-
dicated that the state's purpose was not to inflict pain for pain's sake, but
rather to inflict only the amount of pain falling below a "substantial pain"
208threshold that would be sufficient to execute. It developed its purpo-
sive standard in light of this purpose.
b. The Integration of the Purposive Test Solves Many of the
Problems Inherent in the "Evolving Standards of Decency"
Test
Perhaps in an attempt to rid itself of the problems associated with
the subjective elements of the "evolving standards of decency" test, the
Baze plurality implemented a purposive test. First, the Court's "substan-
tial risk of serious pain" standard mirrored the "degrading severity"
prong of the purposive test because it looked to whether the method of
execution created such a substantial risk of pain that it is exceedingly
cruel.20 9  Second, the plurality incorporated the "wantonly imposed"
prong of the purposive test in its requirement of a "legitimate penological
justification" for the method of execution.210 If there is no legitimate
justification, the method of execution would be "wantonly imposed," or
unusual.21 Finally, the plurality's requirement of a "feasible and readily
available" alternative method of execution was a reflection of the purpo-
sive test's analysis of whether the same penological goal could have been
achieved by a less severe punishment.21 2 If such an alternative existed,
and the state refused to implement it without a "legitimate penological
204. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1531 (2008).
205. Denno, supra note 63, at 73 1.
206. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530-3 1.
207. Id. at 1531-32.
208. See id. at 1530-32.
209. See id. at 1531.
210. See id. at 1532.
211. See id.; see also Berry, supra note 7, at 19 (suggesting that "unusualness" included pu-
nishments that were "arbitrary and discriminatory").
212. See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532; see also Berry, supra note 7, at 19.
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justification," then the state's refusal could be a violation of the Eighth
Amendment under the purposive test.
21 3
By creating its "substantial risk" test as a purposive test, the Baze
plurality avoided some of the problems associated with the subjective
"evolving standards of decency" test. Under its new standard, the Court
first looks to objective "evolving standards of decency" factors, as indi-
cated above.2 14 Then, the Court performs a subjective evaluation of the
method of execution, using its newly-developed purposive test. Unlike
the subjective element found in the "evolving standards of decency" test,
however, the subjective evaluation of the purposive test "ties the use of
the death penalty to the penological goals of the states. 215 Instead of
merely subjecting method of execution challenges to the whims of the
justices, the purposive test analyzes the method of execution's purpose in
light of the state's penological goals.216 Because those goals are often
espoused by the state legislature, which is composed of representatives
of the people, the purposive test is less subject to the whims and fancies
of judges who may not be popularly elected.217 By requiring the courts
to consider the state's purpose for the method of execution, the purposive
test promotes consistency in court decisions, eliminating the chances of
decisions being overturned and more closely reflecting the values and
norms of the people.1 8
However, while the Baze plurality determined that Kentucky's cur-
rent lethal injection protocol withstands this purposive test,219 the inquiry
is not finished. While lethal injection itself is not unusual, it may very
well be considered cruel under a proper pain analysis. 220 Furthermore, it
is likely that the death penalty itself would be considered both cruel and
unusual under the first two prongs of the purposive test.22' Consequent-
ly, future challenges will likely focus on whether the lethal injection pro-
tocol is the least severe method by which a state can accomplish its peno-
logical objectives.222 A proper pain analysis is the key to solving this
issue. If lethal injection truly assures a painless death, then it might
comport with the "dignity of man" and might be judged, not as the "wan-
ton infliction of pain," but as a humane method of execution under the
213. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532.
214. See supra Part 11I.A. 1.
215. Berry, supra note 7, at 31.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 22. In fact, "penological goals" is considered an objective factor under the
"evolving standards of decency" test. Aarons, supra note 133, at 445.
218. See Berry, supra note 7, at 31.
219. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1526 (2008).
220. See Denno, supra note 1, at 102 (stating that problems concerning medical complications
surrounding lethal injection have never been so pronounced); see also Mortenson, supra note 26, at
1161 ("Our system is constructed in such a way that it knowingly puts inmates through agony every
year as they are killed.").
221. Berry, supra note 7, at 30.
222. Id.
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purposive test.223 However, a proper pain analysis is likely to indicate
that lethal injection is by no means a truly humane option for execution,
at least as it is currently implemented.224
B. The Court Must Perform an Extensive Pain Analysis in Order to
Ensure Compliance with the Eighth Amendment
While the Baze plurality succeeded in implementing an improved
test for analyzing methods-of-execution challenges, its proposed standard
is not entirely flawless. In failing to perform an extensive pain analysis,
the Baze plurality did not sufficiently adhere to Kemmler's "negligible
pain" standard in evaluating Kentucky's lethal injection protocol.225 The
Kemmler approach looks at the inmate's experience of death itself rather
than the execution method as a whole.226 Such an approach is appropri-
ate because the Eighth Amendment focuses on the individual experience
of pain during punishment rather than the tool used to punish.227 How-
ever, the Baze plurality not only clearly stated that the potential for pain
does not violate the Eighth Amendment, but it also almost entirely ig-
nored the lack of testing and evaluation surrounding lethal injection.228
In order for lethal injection to remain free from constitutional challenges,
the Court must perform a more comprehensive pain analysis, focusing on
the individual's experience of pain and including proper scientific testing
and medical advice.
1. Conservative Versus Empirical Approaches to Methods of Ex-
ecution
There are two schools of thought regarding a challenge to a method
of execution: the conservative school and the empirical school.229 The
conservative school compares the challenged execution method to pre-
vious methodologies or other currently available methods.230  However,
this approach rarely takes into account the actual operation of the execu-
223. Zimmers & Koniaris, supra note 61, at 920.
224. See Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1104 (stating that even with advanced methods of execu-
tion, more than seven percent of executions continue to be botched, "inflicting... extraordinary pain
on the condemned prisoners as they die."); see also Denno, supra note 1, at 51 (indicating that six of
the eleven inmates lethally injected in California might have been conscious during the procedure,
"potentially creating an 'unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain or suffering' in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.").
225. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,443 (1890).
226. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1109.
227. id. at 1138 ('The same paddle could be used to spank [a misbehaving] child in very dif-
ferent ways. A drunk . . . parent might genuinely hurt the child ... in a way that would universally
be considered cruel .... It makes more sense to describe the spanking (rather than the paddle) as
cruel.").
228. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1529 (2008) ("Some risk of pain is inherent in any method
of execution-no matter how humane-if only from the prospect of error in following the required
procedure. It is clear, then, that the Constitution does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in
carrying out executions.").
229. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1107.
230. id. at 1112.
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tion method. 23' Thus, many conservative courts view pain as simply part
of the death experience itself rather than looking at the individual expe-
rience of a "lingering" or "torturous" death.232
In contrast, the empirical approach looks first to scientific and med-
ical evidence that indicates pain inherent in the execution method.233
Only if such evidence is not sufficient for a finding of unconstitutionality
does the Court consider legislative trends.234 By reviewing legislative
trends "as only one element of a more complex analysis" and by focusing
instead on the infliction of pain, the empirical approach better complies
with Kemmler's "negligible pain" principle.
In following the conservative approach, the Baze plurality per-
formed a comparative analysis. It analyzed prior method-of-execution
cases and took into account the consensus among the states and federal
government surrounding lethal injection.235 However, in order to adhere
to Kemmler, the Court should have adopted the empirical approach. The
Court first should have looked to evidence of pain in Kentucky's lethal
injection protocol, as indicated by scientific and medical evidence. Only
after such an analysis should it have turned its attention to legislative
trends and prior cases. By performing a pain analysis, the Court would
have been properly informed of both the dangers and the benefits of le-
thal injection.
2. Scientific Testing of Lethal Injection
Neither courts nor legislatures appear to place sufficient focus on
scientific studies concerning the potential for pain involved in lethal in-
jections. In developing its lethal injection protocol, Oklahoma virtually
ignored the potential for pain.236 Because most lethal injection states
followed Oklahoma's lead in developing their own protocols, most now
follow a procedure implemented over thirty years ago.237 This procedure
has not been significantly updated and was not properly based on scien-
tific study.238
Because a relatively constant number of executions are botched an-
nually, scientific analysis of the potential for pain in any lethal injection
231. Id.
232. ld. atl 110-ll, 1116.
233. Id. at 1113.
234. Id. The Ninth Circuit has proposed a pain analysis under the empirical approach, consist-
ing of the following steps: first, a review of "objective evidence of pain involved in the challenged
method"; second, a determination of the length of time the condemned inmate will consciously
suffer pain in a "typical" execution, free from botches or failures; and third, a determination of the
risk that a botched execution will occur and cause pain worse than that in a "typical" case. Id. at
1113-14.
235. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1530-32 (2008).
236. Denno, supra note 1, at 65.
237. Id. at 78-79.
238. Id.
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is important.2 39 Lethal injection is constructed in such a way that it can
create problems when performed incorrectly. 240 Even a slight error in
dosage or administration of the first drug can leave an inmate conscious
when the second and third drugs are administered, but paralyzed and thus
prevented from giving any indication of pain.24  Additionally, intense
pain can result if the drugs are injected in the wrong direction in the
veins or the muscle.242 Although such painful executions are "inherently
unjustified and inherently unjustifiable, ' 243 executioners still use the
same formula invented years ago because courts have not required exten-
sive scientific studies on the potential for pain.244
The Baze Court did not appear concerned with performing a pain
analysis. While Justice Ginsburg's dissent called for more extensive
scientific studies regarding the potential pain inherent in lethal injec-
24524tion, the plurality did not require further testing.246  Instead, it pro-
posed that an execution method is not cruel and unusual merely because
it may result in pain.247 However, because severe pain beyond that inhe-
rent in death itself is possible during any lethal injection, the Court must
at least provide for more extensive scientific testing if it wishes to ensure
that lethal injection protocols are in accord with the Eighth Amend-
ment. 248
3. Lethal Injection and the Medical Profession
"[M]edicine is the key to understanding the problems of lethal in-
jection.,,249 However, an unfortunate paradox exists: ethical guidelines
prohibit participation by those who are the most qualified to ensure that
the procedure is performed humanely and constitutionally.250 The Amer-
ican Medical Association clearly forbids doctor participation in execu-
tions, worrying that lethal injection will come to be associated with the
medical profession.251
239. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1104 (noting that seven percent of executions are botched
each year); see also Denno, supra note 1, at 51 (noting that of the eleven inmates lethally injected in
California, six may have been conscious and suffering severe pain).
240. Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1124.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1124-25.
243. id. at 1160.
244. See Denno, supra note 1, at 78-79.
245. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1569 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
246. See id. at 1532-34 (plurality opinion).
247. Id. at 1531.
248. See Denno, supra note 1, at 120.
249. Id. at 55.
250. Id. at 53.
251. Id. at 80-81 (quoting Code of Ethics E-2.06 (Am. Med. Ass'n 2000)) (noting that the
American Medical Association guidelines provide that "[a] physician, as a member of a profession




Yet, physician involvement in lethal injection could be a solution to
the problems associated with the procedure. 2  Many execution team
members are improperly prepared to perform lethal injections; they have
no formal training or knowledge of the drugs used or the risks posed.253
In contrast, medical professionals, especially anesthesiologists, have the
expertise and knowledge to perform lethal injections safely and accurate-
ly.254 There is evidence that a surprising number of physicians partici-
pate in executions despite the existence of ethics rules.255 Some physi-
cians do so because they want the condemned inmates to have the most
competent and humane lethal injection possible; others believe that phy-
sicians are not deciding who gets the death penalty, but rather ensuring
that the procedure is performed accurately and competently.
256
Not only do many medical professionals participate in executions
despite the ethical considerations put forth by the medical associations,
but also the vast majority of lethal injection states include physician re-
quirements in their statutes.257 The presence of such statutory language
illustrates that medical association requirements may not have had their
desired effect.
2 58
In light of the growing number of physicians who participate in le-
thal injections, it appears that medical opinions regarding lethal injection
are changing.25 9 Even the American Medical Association Ethics Council
admitted that doctors can make executions more humane. 260 The pres-
ence of a medical professional at a lethal injection can eliminate the risk
of severe pain, thus ensuring compliance with the Eighth Amendment.26'
Additionally, physician presence would eliminate the lack of training and
262knowledge that permeates nearly every lethal injection execution. The
incorporation of rules regarding physician presence at executions into
lethal injection statutes is a step in the right direction; perhaps it is also
time for medical association guidelines to change as well. This is not to
suggest that physicians should be required to participate in executions, in
light of the strong divergence in public opinion surrounding the death
252. See id. at 77.
253. Id. at 56.
254. See id. at 58.
255. Id. at 83-84, 86 (citing as evidence "Missouri's 'Dr. Doe,' who began performing lethal
injections in the mid-I 990s," and results from the Breach Report).
256. Id. at 86-87 ("Angel of mercy, not agent of harm, is the role inmates seek for the doctor.
Palliative care from a doctor to prevent unnecessary suffering . . . is not unprofessional or unethi-
cal.").
257. Id. at 88. While Illinois' statute explicitly states that doctors cannot participate in execu-
tions, twenty states mention the presence of a doctor at a lethal injection execution, sixteen provide
that a doctor should pronounce or certify death, and eight specifically provide that lethal injections
are not the practice of medicine. Id. at 88-89.
258. Id. at 89.
259. See id. at 121-22.
260. Id. at 121.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 57.
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penalty. However, if medical associations allowed their members to
make their own decisions on whether or not to participate, the risks asso-
ciated with lethal injection would decrease, and the method would be
more likely to comply with the Eighth Amendment.263
C. Solutions to Ensure a Humane Lethal Injection
The past few years have seen an increase in lethal injection chal-
lenges. 264 A constitutional tort may be one way to offer a proper remedy
to the petitioners in these challenges.265 Such a tort would provide for
"the fact that the government has intentionally created a system under
which it knows, ex ante, that some proportion of executed inmates will
suffer agonizing deaths. 266 The possibility of being liable in tort for
botched or painful executions would create an incentive for the govern-
ment either to develop safer and more reliable methods of execution or to
improve the training and research involved in existing execution me-
thods.267 Additionally, it would serve as a formal admission of wrong-
doing and would provide some measure of compensation to the inmates'
families.268
However, a constitutional tort is not by itself a sufficient way to en-
sure the continuous prevention of excessively painful executions. To do
so, attorneys and death penalty abolitionists should implement a national
26legal strategy that incorporates method-of-execution cases. 69 Under
such a coordinated legal strategy, attorneys and abolitionists could work
together to decide which cases and issues should be brought before the
Court.270 This approach would build on past successes and minimize
adverse rulings, thus helping the courts properly define the pain stan-
dards necessary in lethal injections.271 While Baze cemented the use of
lethal injection as a method of execution,272 if a proper pain analysis
were performed, even lethal injection, the most "humane" method of
execution, might be viewed as inflicting substantial pain. A coordinated
legal strategy would assist the courts in this analysis.
Supreme Court decisions based on method-of-execution cases might
also help prompt the legislative branches to take action. Supreme Court
decisions have occasionally brought legislative and executive attention to
273the death penalty.  By coordinating a national litigation strategy fo-
263. See id. at 91.
264. Id. at 107.
265. See Mortenson, supra note 26, at 1121.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1162.
268. Id. at 1105, 1163.
269. Aarons, supra note 134, at 464.
270. See id.
271. Id.
272. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1526 (2008).
273. Aarons, supra note 134, at 442.
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cused on lethal injection cases, abolitionists and attorneys could prompt
state legislatures to extensively review their protocols using valid and
accurate scientific research, implement regulations requiring adequate
training and knowledge, and allow physician participation. This legisla-
tion would help to create a humane lethal injection protocol that passes
constitutional muster.
Furthermore, lethal injection protocols with greater transparency
and oversight would help to ensure compliance with the Eighth Amend-
ment.27 4  In addition to challenges regarding the three-drug protocol,
many lethal injection challenges have arisen regarding, inter alia, the
method in which the drugs are prepared, the qualifications of execution
personnel, facilities where the executions occur, and whether the execu-
tion team properly ensures unconsciousness before the injection of the
second and third drugs.275 Additionally, many lethal injection protocols
are incomplete and filled with scientific inaccuracies. 6 They are written
merely to reassure witnesses that the process is orderly and subject to
controls.277 Moreover, states have withdrawn their protocols from public
scrutiny.278 This likely occurred because public protocols expose the
states' ignorance and incompetence. 279 This lack of public information
surrounding the protocols makes it difficult to evaluate their constitutio-
nality.280 Additionally, because state lethal injection protocols are simi-
lar to one another, when a prisoner challenges one state's protocol, courts
can point to the similar protocols of the other states to show that none
have been held unconstitutional.28'
In order to ensure that lethal injection comports with the Eighth
Amendment, states must revise their protocols. A protocol should be in
writing, and it should specify the conditions of the lethal injection proce-
dure so that the prisoner can be properly monitored for consciousness.282
Most importantly, the protocol should be public information.283  By
opening the state protocols to public viewing, the condemned inmates
will know what to expect, and, most importantly, the public will be able
to monitor the state's lethal injection process.284 Consequently, the state
will not be able to hide the inaccuracies and potential problems inherent
in any improperly developed protocol. By developing a written and pub-
lic protocol, the states will provide more transparency in their lethal in-
274. See Gaitan, supra note 65, at 784.
275. Id. at 774-75.
276. Denno, supra note 64, at 713-14.
277. Id. at 713.
278. Denno, supra note 1, at 95-96.
279. Id. at 95.
280. Id. at 96.
281. Id. at 101-02.
282. Gaitan, supra note 65, at 785-86.
283. Id. at 786.
284. Id.
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jection process, helping to ensure compliance with the Eighth Amend-
ment.285
CONCLUSION
The struggle confronting the courts regarding the constitutionality
of lethal injection is clear after Baze. While Baze integrated a purposive
test of constitutionality into the already-existing objective "evolving
standards of decency" test, it did not incorporate scientific testing and
medical evidence into its pain analysis. Until the Court performs an ex-
tensive pain analysis on the dangers of lethal injection, it cannot ensure
that challenged lethal injection protocols comply with Kemmler's "neg-
ligible pain" standard and thus comport with the Eighth Amendment.
286
Perhaps it is because of a fear of what they will discover that neither
courts nor legislatures are willing to perform an extensive pain analysis
regarding lethal injection. Lethal injection, rightly or wrongly, is consi-
dered the most humane method of execution.287 If it is deemed unconsti-
tutional due to its capacity to inflict severe pain, the courts would be pre-
sented with a challenge to the death penalty itself. This is a type of chal-
288lenge they are not yet ready to consider.
However, the fear of the unknown is no reason to ignore the prob-
lems associated with lethal injection. Scientific testing and medical opi-
nions need to be taken seriously to determine the extent of pain a botched
lethal injection might inflict. 289 Future debate will likely center on
whether there is a less severe alternative to lethal injection. The Court
will be well-prepared for these challenges if it has previously engaged in
an extensive, objective pain analysis regarding lethal injection as a me-
thod of execution.
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